ASEAN Multilateralism and the ARF:
Prospects and Challenges

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Introduction

The question of why states cooperate with one another is one challenging problem in the study of international relations. Why do states cooperate in a world characterized by anarchy, a world without a supra-national government that is able to command obedience from states and enforce international law? States undertake activities that enable them to pursue their own interests. But would cooperation not lead to helping other states pursue their interests?

Taking off from a neoliberal or institutionalist perspective, this article examines the various factors that facilitate cooperation among the participants to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It also examines the brand of multilateral cooperation that developed among the first six members of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), and the prospects and challenges of this kind of multilateralism in the context of a more diverse ARF with 23 participants. It ends by reaffirming the possibility of cooperation among regional states and the utility of institutions in promoting cooperation.

Framework of Analysis

Of late, the debate over inter-state cooperation and the utility of institutions has engaged neorealists and neoliberals (also known as institutionalists) in debate. While both the neorealists and neoliberals believe that anarchy characterizes the international system, they have divergent views on the possibility of inter-state cooperation and the utility of international institutions in promoting cooperation.[1]

Neorealists downplay the prospects of cooperation among states because they believe that anarchy drives states to unilaterally pursue their interests and thereby forego cooperation with one another, making

inter-state cooperation difficult. Only with the presence of a hegemon that enforces the rules of cooperation can states be expected to cooperate. In its absence, states are unlikely to maintain a cooperative arrangement.

On the other hand, neoliberals believe that even in the self-help context of an anarchical international system, cooperation can emerge. In fact, states cooperate with each other in order to pursue their interests.

According to the neoliberals, certain dilemmas in the international environment, namely, the *dilemma of common interest* and *dilemma of common aversion* drive states to cooperate, contrary to the neorealists' claim that it is the presence of a hegemon that drives states towards cooperation. Cooperation enables states to handle these dilemmas.

The *dilemma of common interest* arises when states want to pursue a particular outcome but cannot do so by acting independently of each other. States, therefore, need to *collaborate* with each other in order to attain the outcome they desire. In contrast, the *dilemma of common aversion* arises when states involved merely want to avoid a particular outcome. In this case, they need to *coordinate* their policies and actions in order to elude the particular outcome they commonly want to avoid.[2]

Institutions help states face these dilemmas. While neorealists downplay the role of institutions, neoliberals emphasize the important role of institutions in promoting cooperation. Institutions embody and affect actors' expectations and can thereby "alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues".[3] In addition, because institutions minimize transaction costs, reduce uncertainty, and provide rules of thumb for government action, among others, they not only *facilitate cooperation* among states but also "affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge".[4]

Institutions commonly subscribe to multilateralism, which is an institutional form that "coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties".[5] Its key elements are: (1) generalized principles of conduct, (2) indivisibility, and (3) reciprocity.

Generalized principles of conduct refer to the belief that policies and activities "ought to be organized on a universal basis" at least for the group concerned.[6] *Indivisibility* means that decisions made within the multilateral arrangement are binding upon those involved and that a small number of participants cannot block decisions.[7] *Reciprocity* means that the members expect that the arrangement will "yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time".[8] The element of reciprocity can strengthen inter-state cooperation because states tend to cooperate if they believe that others involved will cooperate in return.

Multilateralism may be expressed in various forms of institutions, which are broadly defined as "recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge"[9] or "persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations".[10] These forms include mechanisms, regimes and organizations. Mechanisms refer to frameworks, procedures, or things that states commonly undertake even in the absence of principles, norms, and rules, or where principles, norms, and rules exist, there lacks a wide acceptance or general agreement among those involved over such principles, norms and rules.

Regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".[11] Organizations refer to a "formal, intergovernmental [body] among geographically proximate states in a region that is internally and externally recognized as distinct".[12] Because an organization is supposed to be formalized, the presence of a bureaucracy supporting and managing its daily affairs is both necessary and a defining characteristic of an organization.

The presence of an organization can make it easier to enforce agreements while its absence can result in the "absence of trust, weak and unreliable information, incentives to defect, and reneging on agreements when it is convenient" for those involved.[13] However, this does not mean that multilateral cooperation cannot exist without organizations. It is, therefore, important not to fuse or confuse the meaning or essence of multilateralism as an institutional form of cooperation with any of the forms in which it may be expressed, be it a mechanism, regime, or organization.[14]

The categories of institutions may be arranged according to the degree to which they become formalized: the higher the formalization, the higher the degree of institutionalization. Mechanisms appear to be the loosest type of institutions. Mechanisms, however, become increasingly formalized through time, particularly if they develop corresponding regimes. Regimes, in turn, may exist with or without an accompanying organization. In the end, regimes become formalized once they develop their own organizations.

It is also important to realize that institutions "need not be accompanied by organizations possessing their own personnel, budgets, physical facilities and so forth".[15] The key factor in institutions is the persistence of the interaction among the actors involved.

Institutions develop their own brands of multilateralism, or ways of going about their affairs and managing issues that confront them. The factors that account for their establishment can help explain the brand of multilateral cooperation that emerges. ASEAN, for example, given the Cold War context and the factors that led to its founding has developed a set of principles, norms, and decision-making procedures that has become the *modus operandi* of the Association particularly for its first six members. This same brand of multilateralism is now being exported to the ARF as the Forum's own *modus operandi* even if the ARF has developed in a totally different context from that of ASEAN and emerged from a different set of factors from those that led to the establishment of ASEAN.

Factors Facilitating Multilateralism in ASEAN

In 1967, five states in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed ASEAN through the Bangkok Declaration.[16] ASEAN was born amidst political and security uncertainties in the founding members' domestic and external environment. Thus, while it was explicitly stated in the Bangkok Declaration that the Association was created primarily for economic cooperation among its members, it was actually founded due to various political and security considerations. Hence, it is no surprise that its development has fostered political more than economic cooperation

among its members. Cooperation in the security and defense areas was never explicitly mentioned because these issues were viewed as sensitive and open to misunderstanding and suspicion. The leaders of ASEAN states carefully avoided ASEAN to be misunderstood as a military grouping of the non-communist bloc against the communist states in Indochina. Besides, they believed that explicit security and defense cooperation was premature since the members had differences in their foreign policy orientation – with some being allied with a major external power and some were of the non-aligned group.[17]

None of the founding members of ASEAN was a hegemon. This supports the contention of the neoliberals that hegemony is not a necessary condition for inter-state cooperation. When "shared interests are sufficiently important", cooperation can emerge and institutions are created even without hegemony.[18]

What shared interests led them to establish ASEAN? Following Axelrod's lead, the need to face the dilemma of common interest and common aversion, may be the answer. The original five members of ASEAN (ASEAN-5) faced the dilemma of common interest – a reconciliation that would pave the way for a harmonious and peaceful relationship among them in order to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals. They wanted to promote reconciliation and achieve a peaceful relationship with their neighbors but without collaborating with each other through ASEAN, they could not have possibly done so.

During that time, Southeast Asia was characterized by inter-state conflicts even among ASEAN-5. These include the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia that resulted in *konfrontasi*, and that between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. There was also tension in the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore that culminated in the latter's expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. The primary reason for the founding of ASEAN was "the need to chart and locate the … process of reconciliation…after confrontation" through the process of dialogue.[19] ASEAN's most urgent task then was to defuse tension and promote the habit of cooperation among its members.[20] Interestingly, ASEAN has not only defused tensions in the bilateral relations of its founding members but it has also strengthened existing bilateral cooperation such as the efforts of Thailand and Malaysia to fight communist insurgents along their borders.[21]

ASEAN-5 also faced the dilemma of common aversion – prospects of great power rivalries in Southeast Asia and the possible collapse of their governments to communism. The European powers were then getting out of the region exemplified by Britain's pullout of its forces leading to an apprehension that a power vacuum, which could attract other less benign powers to come into the region, might emerge.[22] ASEAN-5 was also apprehensive that the big powers might make Southeast Asia an arena for fighting their proxy wars.[23] Thus, they believed that getting their act together, ending their bilateral conflicts, and pursuing equi-distant policy from the superpowers, would give them a better position to prevent the great powers from fighting their wars in Southeast Asia.[24] While there were internal disagreements among ASEAN-5 regarding the presence of great powers in the region, with Indonesia and Malaysia pushing for a Southeast Asia free from great power presence while Thailand and the Philippines maintaining close ties with a major power, the U.S., ASEAN as a group adopted the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration in 1971. This declaration highlights ASEAN's desire to equi-distant itself from great powers in order to prevent them from playing their rivalries in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN-5 also faced another dilemma of common aversion, which was the possibility of their governments collapsing in the face of communist insurgencies. The leaders of ASEAN-5 feared that the domino theory – when a non-communist state falls, the rest will follow – would become a reality. They, therefore, believed that by putting their sources of conflict in the background through ASEAN cooperation, they could create a stable external environment that would allow them to use scarce resources for economic development. Economic development in turn can meet the causes of domestic insurgency such as poverty and social inequality while at the same time boosting the political legitimacy of governments. Because the legitimacy of their governments rested on the ability to promote economic development, cooperation to promote economic growth was seen as beneficial.[25] Government performance in increasing the economic pie from which their people could derive benefits was believed to underwrite the legitimacy of governments.

Features and Principles of ASEAN Multilateralism

In the context of these factors, ASEAN cooperation evolved with the following characteristics. First is the practice of dialogues and consultations with the aim of arriving at a consensus or *musyawarah dan mufakat. Musyawarah,* an Indonesian term, means "arriving at decisions through a process of discussion and consultation" while *mufakat* refers to "consensus reached through the process of *musyawarah".*[26] Consensus, however, does not mean unanimity. It merely means "an amalgamation of the most acceptable views of each and every member".[27] It seeks to establish what is broadly supported to move forward.[28] In ASEAN terms, consensus is *agreeing not to disagree.* As long as the fundamental interests of the dissenting state are not affected, it may not disagree and, therefore, a consensus may arise.[29]

The numerous ASEAN meetings, around 375 each year, which are meeting grounds for ASEAN members to exchange ideas and positions on functional, economic, and political cooperation, attests to this. Through these meetings, the frequency of interactions among the ASEAN member's officials and bureaucrats has been sustained making interaction among the states they represent more durable, thereby enhancing cooperation.[30]

Secondly, ASEAN members only discuss issues where every member is comfortable with preferring instead to shelve in the meantime controversial issues that could disrupt the Association's cohesiveness and unity.[31] ASEAN members have also developed a strategy of compartmentalizing issues so that contentious aspects of certain issues do not preclude ASEAN members from cooperating on less contentious dimensions of an issue.

Thirdly, ASEAN multilateralism is characterized by the inclination to desist from airing differences in public with the aim of projecting a sense of unity and solidarity even if they find it difficult to arrive at a common position.[32] ASEAN members also ensure that no member is isolated. Even in cases where a member may have put forward a position not acceptable to the rest, they still act in a way that saves the face of the proponent.[33]

Fourthly, the "pattern of regular contacts" through the numerous meetings held each year has developed a sense of interpersonalism among ASEAN bureaucrats, which has become a core characteristic of ASEAN multilateralism.[34] The long tenures of ASEAN's authoritarian rulers, who have met regularly through the Summits, also helped boost interpersonalism. This network of personal friendships has resulted in what is called "telephone diplomacy" where ASEAN leaders call each other up during crucial periods of their states' bilateral relations.[35]

Fifthly, ASEAN multilateralism is characterized by the preference for informality and "avoidance of excessive institutionalization".[36] Informality means "avoiding the establishment of institutions and procedures that are too formal and legalistic and that require a degree of transparency and commitment that could deter a meaningful exchange of views".[37] ASEAN cooperation, particularly on security and political issues, is "unstructured with no clear format for decision-making or implementation, often lacks a formal agenda, [and] issues are negotiated on an *ad hoc* basis as and when they arise".[38]

Closely linked with the preference for informality is the process-orientedness of ASEAN multilateralism. It is "not so much about the substance or structure" but about "the process through which interactions are carried out".[39] The process – of providing ideas and bringing parties together – may be as, if not, more important than the actual decision that the group may come up with.[40] Furthermore, while the process may lead to the creation of an organization, it does not necessarily have to.[41] ASEAN remains far from being an organization with formal bureaucratic machinery that has decision-making and decision-implementing functions. Consequently, the emphasis on the process more than the product has resulted in a preference for gradual, methodical, incremental or stair-step approaches – to start slowly and build realistically from what has been started rather than "drawing up grand blueprints or timetables".[42]

In addition to these characteristic features, the following principles are also held sacred in ASEAN cooperation. First, ASEAN members subscribe to the principle of equality of states particularly in shaping

the agenda.[43] This is manifested by the annual rotation of ASEAN's chairmanship among its members. They believe that chairing the Association each year gives each one an equal opportunity to shape the agenda for the following year.[44] This also helps sustain ASEAN's dynamism as each member in the course of its chairmanship adopts programs and projects that move the Association forward. No member during its chairmanship wants to see ASEAN to remain stagnant, also because success of chairmanship is tantamount to regional prestige.[45]

Second is the principle of inclusiveness and open regionalism.[46] The Association is not exclusively for its members but allows the participation of non-ASEAN states in its activities. The members never intended the Association to be their exclusive club, although the Association looked at Southeast Asia as the geographical limit of full membership in ASEAN. Even when it was composed mainly of non-communist states, ASEAN did not preclude the possibility of engaging in dialogue and consultation with Vietnam. In addition, ASEAN also welcomes the involvement of other regional states by encouraging non-ASEAN states to accede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and having dialogue partners.

Thirdly, the principle of non-interference or non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is also valued.[47] This means that members refrain from openly criticizing each other, commenting on their fellow members' government systems, or supporting their neighbor's opposition movements.[48] Thus, even while ASEAN's Western dialogue partners, particularly the European Union were critical of Myanmar's impending membership in ASEAN, the Association refrained from airing its comments on the issue of Myanmar's human rights record.

Fourthly, ASEAN also subscribes to the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, made evident by ASEAN's not being a supra-governmental institution.[49] ASEAN is not envisioned to be a supra-governmental organization that would eventually take away from its members substantive aspects of their sovereignty or expressions of it.

Finally, ASEAN also believes in the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members, a principle clearly enunciated in the TAC, which

provides for the convening of a High Council for the peaceful resolution of conflict.[50] However, this council is yet to be convened. Furthermore, in the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, ASEAN members also called for a peaceful resolution of the conflicting claims of Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the islands, reefs, atolls, shoals, and other features in the South China Sea.

The Establishment of the ARF

Prior to the establishment of the ARF, proposals to this effect have been put forward by Senator Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister and Joe Clark, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Curiously, while these proposals were initially positively responded to, they did not prosper for several reasons. First, because these proposals were viewed as following the model of the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) now the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it was felt that the model was far too elaborate and structured for the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, it was also felt that it was difficult to transport a model from one region to another. Thirdly, the CSCE at that time could not pride itself of notable achievement. In fact, it was not able to do anything as Yugoslavia fell to pieces in the early 1990s. Fourthly, there was an aversion to Western-type proposals as the ASEAN states felt that it could be a "prelude to further interference, if not domination" by Western countries. [51]

In June 1991, the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS)[52] submitted to ASEAN a memorandum titled "A Time for Initiative: Proposals for Consideration at the Fourth ASEAN Summit". Through this memorandum, ASEAN-ISIS proposed that the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 lay the groundwork for an Asia Pacific Political Dialogue.[53] ASEAN-ISIS advocated that ASEAN plays a central role in the dialogue mechanism that will be established, either as a creative initiator or an active participant or both.[54] It was also suggested that the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) be turned into an ASEAN-PMC Plus where states invited by the ASEAN Ministers' Meeting as guests or observes may be invited for discussions on regional security.[55]

Meanwhile, between the period when ASEAN-ISIS came up with this memorandum and the Summit of 1992, Taro Nakayama, the Japanese Foreign Minister suggested during the ASEAN-PMC meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 that the PMC be made a venue for addressing regional peace and security.[56] However, his suggestion fell on deaf ears, the idea "having come from a ranking official of a major regional power whose foreign policy motives remain suspect in the minds of many of its neighbors".[57]

In 1992 during the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore, ASEAN decided to use the PMC meeting as a mechanism for promoting political and security dialogues with its dialogue partners.[58] In 1993, during the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore, ASEAN finally announced its plan to launch the ARF.[59] The specifics of the ARF "reflect the main arguments of the ASEAN-ISIS proposal for this initiative".[60] The first meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok in July 1994.

The ARF is an official forum where the ten ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietam), their dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Russia, and the U.S.), and Papua New Guinea as an observer discuss security and political issues. The foreign ministers of these participant states attend the annual meeting of the Forum usually in July or August of each year. A senior officials meeting called the ARF-SOM held annually in May supports the ARF. In a particular year, various inter-sessional activities, namely the meetings of the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs); and Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on Disaster Relief, on Search and Rescue Cooperation, and on Peacekeeping Operations are held. The ISGs and ISMs are co-chaired by an ASEAN and non-ASEAN participant. The findings of these ISGs and ISMs are presented during the ARF-SOM where they are reviewed.

ASEAN took the initiative of establishing the ARF because it realized that the security of Southeast Asia and of the wider Asia-

Pacific region has become inextricably linked.[61] Consequently, ASEAN took upon itself to lead the ARF. Besides, it is the only actor credible enough to lead it and to which all the great powers in the region would yield.

In addition, the dilemmas of common interest and common aversion prompted ASEAN to initiate and lead the ARF. The dilemma of common interest may be operationalized as providing a regional security mechanism to deal with political and security issues in the post–Cold War period and possibly playing a leading role in shaping the security processes in the wider Asia-Pacific region.[62] It has been observed that ASEAN states see the ARF as a "constructive multilateral framework" where ASEAN can lead the discussion of political and security issues.[63]

The loss of the Cold War overlay that promoted regional peace through balance of forces between the superpowers meant a need to find a regional mechanism to deal with political security issues. ASEAN wanted to have a leading role in it aside from its awareness that no other regional actor can initiate such a multilateral mechanism. In addition, the impressive progress of the various ASEAN economies and in the internal security situation of the ASEAN members gave them the confidence to make ASEAN play a role outside the confines of Southeast Asia.[64]

The dilemma of common interest operationalized as the need to deal with other regional powers was another facilitating factor behind the establishment of the ARF. The rising tension between the U.S. and China indicated that peace through traditional balance of forces was not functioning smoothly and there was a need for new mechanisms.[65] ASEAN used the mechanism of the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) to discuss political, security, and economic issues with its dialogue partners. However, a mechanism that involves China and Russia, which were not yet included in the ASEAN-PMC at that time and one that goes beyond bilateral dialogues of the ASEAN-PMC had to be devised.

ASEAN states also realized that "the trick is to get the big powers involved" in regional security mechanisms.[66] ASEAN states, small powers that they are, can deal with the bigger ones more effectively if

they were all participants in a mechanism for cooperation. ASEAN's initiation of the ARF that encouraged the participation of the great powers is an innovation in the Association's approach. ASEAN previously adopted an insulationist approach by equi-distancing itself from great powers to avoid great power rivalry in Southeast Asia made evident through its conceptualization of ZOPFAN. Through the ARF, however, ASEAN has adopted an inclusionary approach of constructively engaging the great powers.[67] How does the ARF enable the ASEAN states to deal with regional powers? It "allows small and medium powers a significant voice in regional security affairs and inhibits the major powers from dominating the regional security agenda".[68] The participation of the big powers puts a moderating influence on them, particularly China and Japan that are sources of anxiety among other regional states in the same way that Indonesia's participation in ASEAN has moderated and transformed it from "a potential threat to a benign elder brother" among the ASEAN states.[69]

ASEAN states also face the dilemma of common aversion, which is the possible emergence of a power vacuum in the region that may be avoided if the U.S. is encouraged to remain engaged in the region.[70] A mechanism that would keep the U.S. strategically involved in regional affairs had to be devised. But it had to be a forum and not a military alliance since the threats to the region's security do not come from a particular enemy. The ARF, by providing a venue for U.S. participation in regional security dialogue, would encourage it to remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific.

The other Asia-Pacific states participate in the ARF to address the dilemma of common interest they share with the ASEAN states, namely the need to preserve regional peace and stability and to deal with the uncertainty in the regional security environment.[71] The uncertainty in the regional security environment stems from the following: the future foreign policy and security posture of regional powers such as China, Japan, and India; the presence of potential flashpoints in the region such as the South China Sea disputes, the China-Taiwan issue, the reunification of the Korean peninsula; and the presence of non-traditional security concerns, such as transnational criminality and environmental problems.

It appears that regional states believe that regional peace and stability can be more adequately preserved if a mechanism, by which regional states can come together to articulate and discuss their views, is available. Furthermore, because issues that contribute to regional uncertainty need to be worked on collectively, a multilateral approach rather than bilateral or unilateral approaches is considered as more appropriate.[72]

Moreover, together with ASEAN states, other Asia-Pacific states also face the dilemma of common aversion, namely the emergence of a power vacuum in the region and the concomitant assertion of military capabilities by other regional states. By providing a mechanism by which the U.S. is kept involved in regional affairs, the ARF could help prevent a power vacuum or its consequences to the region's security from emerging. In addition, the ARF provides a mechanism by which the other participant states could collectively mitigate the consequences of a possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region.

ASEAN Multilateralism in the ARF

ASEAN members do not only hold exclusive chairmanship to the ARF but ASEAN's brand of multilateralism has also become the *de facto modus operandi* of the Forum. To recall, ASEAN brand of multilateralism is characterized by the preference for dialogues and consultations towards consensus, avoidance of conflict, allowing parties involved to save face, inclination towards informality, focus on the process, and development in an evolutionary manner.

Dialogues and consultations towards consensus can "bring a meeting of minds" and make states involved comfortable with one another.[73] They foster a willingness to understand diverse positions, cultivate patience and perseverance, constrain some states from unduly exercising influence or coercion over the others, and allow a minority state to articulate its position.[74]

Dialogues are also crucial to start cooperation and can increase the "incidence of cooperation" because they can alter preferences, create a feeling of shared identity, encourage norms, or facilitate promising behavior.[75] In times of conflict, dialogues pave the way for communication about accidents and may prevent the deterioration of

relationships and thereby play a useful role in reducing uncertainty and anxiety.[76]

Consultations also pave the way for the formulation of sound policies. Consulting each party involved and soliciting its position and views lead to a decision or policy that reflects the group's position, which has a greater chance of being broadly supported.

However, too much focus on dialogues and consultation could also mean that states can "simply keep talking forever without getting anywhere, and never doing anything".[77] In the fast changing globalized world, dialogues and consultations may simply not suffice. While dialogues are instrumental in getting things started, it does not necessarily follow that states involved in dialogues will progress beyond dialogues.[78]

It has also been observed that the dialogue mechanism of ASEAN is only devised to lessen, if not completely, prevent the occurrence of conflict but is not intended to "resolve crises once these have broken out, much less stop conflicts when crisis management fails".[79] This being the case, the ARF can not also be expected to resolve disputes in the foreseeable future in spite of the possibility that it may be incumbent upon the ARF to pursue the resolution of disputes that continue to create uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.

The search for consensus also makes the process tedious as the process involves "a myriad list of new positions, proposals, and initiatives on a single issue being floated for extensive consultations in several informal meetings just to ensure that consensus can be reached".[80] For example, the ARF has been talking about preventive diplomacy since 1995. However, to date, it has not reached a consensus whether or not to start promoting actively preventive diplomacy. It is also sad to note that the ARF, at the official track, is yet to adopt a definition of preventive diplomacy and its principles that can be applied to the Asia-Pacific region.

Consensual decision-making also means moving at the speed of the slowest common denominator.[81] In spite of its flexibility, this approach will remain "hostage to the imperatives of national interest" because of the need to arrive at a consensus, thus giving each participant

state a *de facto* veto on the pace of the ARF's development or issues that can be discussed.[82] This can undermine the Forum, particularly if such national interests do not coincide with those of other states. For example, China has consistently opposed the possibility of the ARF moving on to the promotion of preventive diplomacy measures. It argues that the ARF should proceed at a pace comfortable to all participants, that it should focus instead on promoting confidence building measures (CBMs), and that preventive diplomacy may constitute an interference in the internal affairs of states. It appears that China is not yet comfortable with the idea of the ARF moving on to a preventive diplomacy mode.

The premise of lowest common denominator may also erode the ARF's decision-making capacity because of its inability to arrive at timely decisions on certain issues.[83] The regional context in the previous decades may have afforded ASEAN states the luxury of moving at the pace of the slowest member. However, the ARF no longer enjoys such luxury in today's interdependent world. While it always pays to proceed cautiously, the changed global and regional setting may necessitate a faster pace for the Forum. However, while it is expected to be quick in responding to regional security challenges, the involvement of numerous and diverse states makes it more difficult to arrive at a consensus and consequently timely and relevant responses to issues.

The shelving of sensitive issues ensures that states involved are not turned off from participation and that progress in other areas where cooperation may be pursued is not impeded. "By not confronting the problem head-on and instead diverting it so that it does not stand in the way of broader cooperation, and by allowing time to pass, the intensity of a conflict/problem diminishes and its importance is reduced".[84] This may also create enough goodwill among those involved that may encourage "restrained political and military behaviour".[85] This also helps build confidence, enhances the comfort level among ARF participants, and prevents them from being antagonized, thereby allowing security dialogue to take off.

Conflict avoidance has also relatively worked in the ARF. In spite of the participation of states that are suspicious of each other such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, no confrontation has resulted between them. While other factors may account for this, their

participation in the ARF may have moderated or tempered what could have been more aggressive actions. Involvement in regional institutions like the ARF puts a subtle pressure on participants to avoid aggressive unilateral actions with which they can be criticized and made to explain during their future interactions with the other participants in the Forum.

However, non-discussion of sensitive issues can also keep the process from moving forward and can be perceived as excuses for doing nothing.[86] If confidence and trust are really established through dialogues and consultations, and if the states involved really feel comfortable with each other, why then are they not capable of discussing sensitive issues? For example, the issue of preventive diplomacy being practiced over the South China Sea cannot even be openly discussed in the official agenda of the ARF as China insists that it should be done outside the ambit of the ARF.

Along this line, Leifer pointed to a paradox of ASEAN multilateralism. "[A]ppearance of harmony through consultations is put at risk if [they] try to address problems because [once] they begin to address problems, it can feedback adversely on the harmony. But by not addressing problems, [they] let matters drift and this could cause a deterioration in the security environment."[87]

There is apprehension that ASEAN multilateralism's characteristic feature of avoiding conflicts may not work in the context of the ARF. While the relative weakness of ASEAN members in an inhospitable environment gave them incentive to avoid conflict, the ARF includes relatively powerful states that may be relatively less willing to avoid conflicts with other equally powerful players. Furthermore, while the ARF may need to address conflicts in the longer term, it may find it difficult to do so because ASEAN multilateralism upon which it is based prefers to go around contentious issues and has not developed techniques to confront conflict directly.[88]

Refraining from publicly airing differences forged a sense of solidarity among the original members of ASEAN. Not putting a member on the spot facilitates compromises. Discussions are held on the sidelines resulting in what scholars call "quiet diplomacy", that is in part facilitated by the network of personal friendships that developed among the senior officials and bureaucrats of the ASEAN members.

However, not airing differences publicly has made the ARF appear unresponsive to important issues. Even for the ARF that is relatively young, it is unfortunate that foreign and defense officials that meet in its annual ministerial meetings now seem to be more predisposed in maintaining and projecting a façade of solidarity rather than to discuss contentious issues that need to be discussed. This is counterproductive and is seen as lack of political courage to say things the participants believe in.[89]

There may also be instances when airing differences in public is useful so as to prevent a state involved from developing the notion that the others involved condone its actions. For instance, if the other participants do not air their opposition to China's actions in the South China Sea, Beijing may develop the impression that other ARF participants do not mind what it does in the area. This may make China bolder in aggressively pursuing its claims, which may lead to an armed confrontation with the other claimants leading to regional instability.

The numerous meetings held each year have enabled the senior officials and bureaucrats of ASEAN to develop a network of personal friendships, which resulted in what is called "telephone diplomacy". The "close and cordial meetings at the highest levels of leadership and its powerful symbolism of intra-ASEAN solidarity, have helped ASEAN to work collectively towards a peaceful approach in managing inter-state disputes, or in responding to common security concerns".[90] Moreover, because senior ministers and officials of ASEAN members regularly meet, they have come to know each other personally and a sense of camaraderie has developed. They have also provided a continuing link among their states.

For the ARF, its various inter-sessional activities and its annual meeting is seen to foster close ties among the senior foreign and defense officials of the states involved. The cultivation of ties and development of a network among the foreign and defense ministers of participating states who play a key role in their states' foreign and defense policies, respectively may encourage the participant states to adopt policies that promote regional peace and stability.

However, the personalistic character of ASEAN multilateralism would mean that it remains to be "predominantly leader-driven:

initiatives and agreements are·reached at the highest levels of government while secretariats and support structures remain skeletal".[91] This also means that multilateral cooperation in the ARF continues to be based on personalities who are not going to outlive the Forum. Political leaders leave political life, foreign ministers get changed, and other senior officials retire. Changes in political leadership in the ARF participants, therefore, directly affect regional cooperation as policies rely heavily on the personal orientation of political leaders. While the foreign policy orientation of political leaders definitely affects regional cooperation, a mechanism that does not have to rely heavily on the personal relationships that develop among political leaders has better chances of surviving domestic political succession.

The informality of ASEAN multilateralism also raises the comfort level among states involved and creates "a flexible decision-making environment, which allows room for shifts in national bargaining positions".[92] It cultivates a non-threatening environment that encourages exploring ways to solve certain problems.[93] Informalities are preferred over formal mechanisms because they can better move the process forward rather than formal ones that may be rigid and thus have the tendency to create stalemates.

The absence of procedures that are too formal and legalistic and that may require a degree of transparency assures ARF participants that they are not forced to share information about their domestic political and economic situation that they may not be comfortable in sharing. The absence of a well-structured bureaucracy that needs to be maintained means less financial responsibility for ARF participants, which may not be in a position to contribute substantial financial support for the upkeep of such machinery.

The production and sharing of defense white papers may be a case in point. While the ARF has identified the basic information that these documents should contain, it has nonetheless given individual participants the flexibility and ultimate decision regarding the kind of information that are included or excluded in the white papers that they will produce and share with other participants.

However, some observers fear that informality leads to inability to enforce commitments.[94] As problems that states face increase and

become more complex, there may be a need to have more formal mechanisms to effectively address such problems. For the ARF, the informality characteristic of ASEAN multilateralism may have been appropriate in its initial years when the dialogue process was being set up. However, as it matures there may be a need to make it more formalized to make it better able to manage issues that impinge on Asia-Pacific security. In addition, bureaucracies and organizations can promote cooperation by making interactions among those involved more durable and more frequent.

The process-orientedness of ASEAN multilateralism may lead to the generation of ideas and the bringing of parties together. For the ARF composed of diverse countries, the process of bringing them together to discuss various issues that affect them may be more important than results. Therefore, the process is seen as useful regardless of the final outcome.[95] The focus on the process may also help socialize the non-ASEAN participants of the ARF to the ASEAN Way of doing things.

However, while the process may be at least as important as the product, all process and no product is not going to be helpful and will make the entire mechanism difficult to sustain. In the absence of an "ability to measure progress, to take stock and to develop new initiatives", the process may become inefficient and irrelevant.[96] Worse, there is apprehension that during crisis or war, dialogues and all these processes cannot be maintained without having concrete results.[97]

ASEAN's preference for a "step-by-step approach" may make the relevant states more comfortable with each other, which is a necessary precondition for future cooperation. Furthermore, taking numerous small steps rather than one or two large steps can better facilitate cooperation among those involved by increasing the chances of one meeting the other in the future. The increased yet indefinite chances of meeting each other at some future occasion encourages cooperation because of the prospects of future reprisal from the other actors involved.[98] Small steps instead of large ones result from breaking the issues down into doable pieces. Moreover, the approach of agreeing on principles first and allowing things to evolve and grow gradually spares the ARF from incurring the costs associated with immediately creating bureaucracies/structures or adopting programs that may not

work in the future. While bureaucracies can help facilitate cooperation, it is more practical to test the viability of cooperation first rather than to immediately create bureaucracies.

However, this has created different sets of expectations among the ARF participants making it difficult for the Forum to move forward. While the ASEAN states are happy that the ARF meets once a year and provides a venue for security dialogue, some of the dialogue partners have expressed disappointment with the way the ARF has evolved. For the ASEAN states, the presence of a forum that provides participant states the platform to talk with each other is an achievement in itself while for the dialogue partners, particularly the Western states, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the U.S., more concrete and substantive forms of cooperation are needed.[99]

The principles governing ASEAN multilateralism may also promote and sustain inter-state cooperation among the ARF participants. First, the principle of equality of states ensures that no state will dominate the Forum. The Southeast Asian experience shows that previous attempts at regional cooperation failed, particularly in the case of MAPHILINDO, because of the perceived intention and tendency of Indonesia to dominate it.

Secondly, the principle of inclusiveness or open regionalism opens the possibility of bringing diverse states with various perspectives into a dialogue process, which is necessary in fostering cooperation.[100]

Adherence to the principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity has assured ARF participants that other states involved will not have a channel to interfere in their internal affairs.

The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes also promotes and sustains cooperation among ARF participants. While ASEAN has not directly resolved disputes, membership in ASEAN has encouraged them to seek a peaceful resolution to their disputes. Hopefully, the participation of the other Asia-Pacific states in the ARF would also encourage them to seek for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts they are involved in.

However, these principles may also pose limitations and constraints. For one, ensuring equality among the participants by rotating the chairmanship each year also leads to an *ad hoc* setting of the agenda. This practice may prevent the ARF from pursuing a common agenda consistently through the years.[101] Moreover, while this principle is supposedly observed in ASEAN cooperation, leadership in the ARF continues to be held exclusively by ASEAN participants.

Secondly, there are also limits to how inclusive a group may be and that the timeliness of including other relevant actors must be carefully considered. While the participants have set the ARF's geographical footprint as providing a brake to unlimited enlargement, the inclusion to the Forum of newly born states, such as East Timor should be carefully examined.

Thirdly, the subscription to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states may make the ARF irrelevant and unresponsive especially in the context of challenges that are transnational in character. It is now "difficult and unrealistic to insist that the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states be sustained if domestic instability in one country spills beyond its borders and undermines the security of its neighbors".[102] For example, internal strife that drive people to become refugees in neighboring states impose additional burdens in terms of providing human needs such as food, housing, and medicine on the host country. Furthermore, if the host is not able to provide for these refugees or if their large number creates social, political, and economic problems for the host country, the issue can no longer be considered as a purely domestic concern of the state where the refugees originated. When forces of instability or challenges to domestic security that originate outside of "state boundaries penetrate societies that had nothing to do or little to do with their causes", the affected state can no longer afford to ignore these forces and allow them "to wreak havoc upon its society and peoples".[103]

While there is indeed a very thin line separating interference and legitimate intervention, the transnational character of problems today necessitates that states should involve themselves in issues that may be domestic in nature but affect other states and the region itself. For example, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines need to articulate their concern over the forest fires that annually occur in Indonesia

because the resulting haze is not only confined within the territorial boundaries of Indonesia but also affects these ASEAN members.

Moving Beyond ASEAN Multilateralism

The characteristic features of ASEAN multilateralism may have been necessary to start the process of cooperation among the ARF participants. However, it appears that these same characteristics including the principles that govern ASEAN multilateralism are not sufficient to sustain cooperation and the ARF itself. The ARF needs to develop its own brand of multilateralism. As Acharya argues, there is a need for the ARF to develop from the so-called "ASEAN Way" its own "Asia-Pacific Way".[104] The leaders and policy makers of the ARF participants must develop the ARF's own identity.

For example, ARF leaders should exert efforts to move beyond dialogues and consultations and the emphasis on the process over achieving concrete results or products. All process and no product can lead to disappointment and disillusionment, which may lead some of the states involved to disengage from multilateral cooperation. Thus, it may be appropriate for the ARF to start becoming more pro-active in promoting preventive diplomacy, which is considered as the next higher stage of the Forum's evolution, the promotion of confidence building measures (CBMs) as the initial stage. While some ARF participants, notably China, may think that it is still premature for the ARF to move to a preventive diplomacy mode, it is necessary for the Forum to do so, if only to prove that it is moving forward. Besides, CBMs and preventive diplomacy measures do overlap. Among the four proposals of preventive diplomacy measures that the ARF could undertake, all have elements of CBMs and preventive diplomacy. These proposals include: (1) enhancement of ARF Chair's role, (2) creation of a Register of Experts/Eminent Persons Group, (3) publication of an annual Security Outlook, and (4) provision of voluntary background briefings.[105]

Furthermore, while avoidance of conflict is desirable, issues that are potential sources of conflict should not just be swept under the rug. Instead, they should be discussed with an open mind among the policy makers of the states involved and with the end view of coming up with an approach for managing these issues acceptable to all concerned.

Face-saving is an important aspect of the Asian approach. However, it does not mean refraining from giving constructive comments on the way a member or participant behaves. ARF leaders should find ways of making suggestions to the leaders of the other participants without necessarily embarrassing them in public.

An initial step would be to specifically include pressing regional security issues, such as the South China Sea dispute in the agenda of the various inter-sessional activities and the annual ministerial meeting of the ARF itself and to discuss these issues within the platform provided by the Forum. While certain ARF participants may not want to tackle these issues within the ambit of the ARF, the other participants should actively push for their discussion including an examination of various measures to handle these challenges.

The personal network of political leaders and senior officials is an important foundation of multilateral cooperation. After all, it is people who make decisions. Even in a bureaucratized and formalized setting, personal networks and informal modes of interaction remain important. However, ARF leaders and senior officials should find ways to formalize modes of interaction so that changes in domestic political leaderships and of senior officials do not jeopardize cooperation among the states involved. In the context of the ARF, multilateralism can no longer afford to be highly personality-driven and personality-led if cooperation among the states involved is to become sustainable.

Furthermore, while informality may be a key component of ASEAN multilateralism, the different context of the ARF necessitates that it starts developing more formal structures to enable it to promote regional security more effectively. The ARF participants should seriously consider setting up a secretariat that will be responsible for the day-to-day administrative needs of the Forum and serve as a repository of the ARF's relevant documents. It is a sad note that the Forum continues to lack an official Internet site. Information regarding the ARF can only be found at the Internet site of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Meanwhile, as an interim measure, ASEAN can consider setting up an ARF desk within the ASEAN Secretariat.

The ARF must not only be seen as a mere extension of ASEAN but an institution that is unique in its own right. Thus, ASEAN may

need to share leadership in the ARF with the other participants. There are several proposals towards this end. One, the ARF should have two co-chairs – one from ASEAN and another from a non-ASEAN participant. Two, the ARF should have a triumvirate for the ARF chair composed of the present, the immediate past, and next chairmen.[106] The triumvirate would also ensure the continuity of agenda. A third formula is to have a combination of these proposals, a triumvirate as in the second proposal, with the present chairmanship alternating between an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN participant. This would make the ARF more relevant to the other participants. In addition, there may be a need in the long run to have a separate secretariat or a secretary-general to support the activities of the ARF between the ministerial meetings held each year.[107]

Revisiting the Neorealist and Neoliberal Debate

In the early years of this decade, the neoliberals' argument that institutions are important in managing security challenges appeared to have gained prominence. The proliferation of regional institutions and ascendancy of ASEAN and the ARF as the two most important regional institutions have supported this. The seeming euphoria over the end of superpower competition and the high hopes that resulted from it made policy makers in the region attach greater importance to the value of regional institutions.

However, as the decade came to a close, the high expectations placed on regional institutions were not met. The inability and ineffectiveness of regional institutions in responding to security challenges such as the Asian economic crisis, lingering territorial and maritime disputes, other traditional security concerns, and non-traditional security challenges disappointed people. Consequently, it appeared that neoliberalism (institutionalism) was on a retreat and neorealism has gained prominence.

Nonetheless, the seeming inability of regional institutions to solve regional security problems does not really invalidate the claims of neoliberalism regarding the possibility of inter-state cooperation and the utility of institutions. While the situation in the region may have given credence to the pessimism of the neorealists, it does not prove the superiority of the neorealists' assumptions or futility of

neoliberalism.[108] It merely shows that there is a need to reform the way regional institutions conduct their affairs, that there may be a need to go beyond the "ASEAN Way" and adopt a more rules-based interaction among the states involved in these institutions.[109]

Regional institutions continue to remain important, if not more important, in times of uncertainty. The fact that states in the region continue to remain involved in these regional institutions bears this out. For if these states no longer see any benefit in being members or participants to these institutions, the region should have already seen the demise of these institutions. In spite of the challenges confronting the ARF, no participant has disengaged from it. Instead, the roster of states involved continues to grow with the recent inclusion of North Korea.

Conclusion

In spite of the common perception that states want to pursue their interests unilaterally, cooperating with other states can also enable them to pursue their interests, especially in the face of the dilemma of common interest and common aversion. Institutions can also help facilitate cooperation among states.

In Southeast Asia, regional cooperation among the first six members of ASEAN has resulted to a brand of ASEAN multilateralism with its own unique characteristic features and principles. It is this brand of multilateralism that ASEAN now tries to export to the wider Asia-Pacific through the ARF. However, the very same characteristic features and principles of this brand of multilateralism that have worked initially for ASEAN, may not equally necessarily be as affective for the ARF. Thus, there is a need for the ARF to continue adapting to the changing regional environment, making the necessary adjustments regarding the way it does things, in order to remain relevant and effective. This is particularly important since the pessimism of the neorealists regarding the utility and effectiveness of institutions appear to have gained credence as the decade of the 1990s came to a close. ✤

Notes

[1] For the terms of this debate, see David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics," pp. 3-25; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," pp. 85-115; Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," pp. 116-140; Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," pp. 269-300; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," pp. 301-338 in David A. Baldwin, editor, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). See also Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[2] See Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*.

[3] Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," p. 94.

[4] For this point, see Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 9 and 240.

[5] John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Helen Milner and John Gerard Ruggie, editors, *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11.

[6] James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," in Milner and Ruggie, eds., *Multilateralism Matters*, p. 55.

[7] Mark W. Zacher, "Multilateral Organizations and the Institution of Multilateralism: The Development of Regimes for Non-Terrestrial Spaces," in Milner and Ruggie, eds., *Multilateralism Matters*, p. 399.

[8] Ruggie, "Multilateralism," p. 11.

[9] Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, editor, *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 93.

[10] Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," *International Journal* (Autumn 1990): 731 as cited in Ruggie, "Multilateralism," p. 10.

[11] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," in Krasner, editor, *International Regimes*, p.2.

[12] Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* Vol 46 No 2 (Winter 1993) : 442.

[13] Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism," p. 62.

[14] Ruggie, "Multilateralism," p. 14.

[15] Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 25 as cited in Andrew Hurrel, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Lousie Fawcett and Andrew Hurrel, editors, *Regionalism in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 42.

[16] See The ASEAN Declaration, August 8, 1967.

[17] See Soedjati J. Djiwandono, "Southeast Asia and the South Pacific: The Role of ASEAN," in International Peace Academy, *Security in Southeast Asia and the SouthWest Pacific* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1989), pp. 155-166.

[18] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 12.

[19] Interview with Michael Leifer, Director, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, December 13, 1998.

[20] Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defense Community," *Pacific Affairs* Vol 64 No 2 (Summer 1991) : 161.

[21] See Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (London, England: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1990), pp. 34-68.

[22] See Yoshiyuki Hagiwara, "The Formation of ASEAN," in K.S. Sandhu. et. al., *The ASEAN Reader* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), p. 35.

[23] Interview with Terrence O'Brien, former Director, Centre for Strategic Studies of New Zealand, December 13, 1999.

[24] Interview with Suchit Bunbongkarn, Chairman of the Board, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, February 13, 1999.

[25] Acharya, "ASEAN: Security Community or Defense Community," pp. 162-163.

[26] Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 20 No 1 (April 1998) : 58.

[27] Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: from the 'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?," *Pacific Review* Vol 10 No 3 (1997) : 330.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[29] See Herman Joseph Kraft, "ASEAN Expansion and Intra-ASEAN Relations" (Unpublished Paper, n.d.), p. 12.

[30] See Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 1984), p. 129.

[31] Interview with Kao Kim Hourn, Executive Director, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, February 14, 1999 and Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 16 No 4 (March 1995) : 406.

[32] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," p. 331.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way," *Asian Survey* Vol XXXVII No. 10 (October 1997) : 968., "ASEAN and the ARF," pp. 966-967.

[35] Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement," p. 60.

[36] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," p. 329.

[37] *Idem.,* "ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security," in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, editors, *New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p. 188.

[38] *Idem.,* "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," p. 329.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 329.

[40] Interview with Aileen Baviera, Executive-Director, Philippine-China Development Resource Center (PDRC), Manila, Philippines, January 25, 1999.

[41] Kwa Chong Guan, "Reflections on Prospects for Asia-Pacific Multilateralism," in Michael W. Everett and Mary A. Sommerville, editors, *Multilateral Activities In Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 166.

[42] Ralph A. Cossa, "Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures," in Ralph A. Cossa, editor, *Asia-Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, [1995]), p. 8 and Michael Haas, *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1989) as cited in Kwa, "Reflections on Prospects of Asia-Pacific Multilateralism," p. 167.

[43] See Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

[44] Interview with Hadi Soesastro, Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia, February 13, 1999.

[45] Interview with Akiko Fukushima, Senior Researcher, Japan's National Institute for Research Advancement, February 28, 1999.

[46] Interview with Soesastro.

[47] See Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

[48] John Funston, "ASEAN: Out of its Depth?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 20 No 1 (April 1998) : 27.

[49] See Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

[50] See *ibid* and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.

[51] See Darmp Sukontasap, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: An Asia-Pacific Model for Multilateral Security Cooperation," in Joachim Krause

and Frank Umback, editors, *Perspectives of Regional Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: Learning from Europe or Developing Indigenous Models?* (Bonn, Germany: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), pp. 133-134.

[52] ASEAN-ISIS is a grouping of non-governmental research institutes in ASEAN originally composed of the following: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS) Philippines, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) Thailand, and Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). It now includes Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Laotian Institute of Foreign Affairs, and Institute of International Relations (IIR) of Vietnam.

[53] See Carolina G. Hernandez, *Complex Interdependence and Track Two Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era* (Quezon City: College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, U.P. Diliman, 1995), pp. 16-17.

[54] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

[55] Jusuf Wanandi, "The Future of the ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture," in Bunn Nagara and Cheah Siew Ean, editors, *Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific* (Malaysia: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), p. 283.

[56] Sukontasap, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 132.

[57] Hernandez, "Complex Interdependence and Track Two Diplomacy," p. 17.

[58] See Sukontasap, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 135.

[59] See *ibid.,* p. 135.

[60] Hernandez, "Complex Interdependence and Track Two Diplomacy," p. 18.

[61] See Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN in Asia-Pacific," *AUS-CSCAP Newsletter Number. 5,* October 1997, found at http://www.coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Auscnws5.html.

[62] Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, "ASEAN and ARF," *ASEAN-ISIS Monitor,* October-December 1997, p. 4.

[63] Interview with Kao.

[64] Interview with Baviera.

[65] David Dickens, *Lessening the Desire for War: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Making of Asia Pacific Security (CSS Working Paper 11/98)* (New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 7.

[66] Interview with Stuart Harris, Professor and Convenor Northeast Asia Program, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, December 13, 1998.

[67] Goh Teck Seng, *ASEAN and the Post-Cold War Regional Order: Beyond ZOPFAN to the ARF (ADSC Working Paper)* (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1997), p. 2.

[68] Hassan, "ASEAN and the ARF," p. 4.

[69] Jose T. Almonte, "ASEAN-10: Challenges and Implications," *ASEAN-ISIS Monitor*, July-September 1997, p. 2.

[70] Interview with Desmond Ball, Professor, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, December 18, 1998; interview with Ralph Cossa, Executive Director, U.S. Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 19, 1998; interview with Kwa Chong Guan, Vice-Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, February 28, 1999; and Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 16 No 1 (June 1994) : 17.

[71] Interview with Ball.

[72] Interview with Bunbongkarn.

[73] Interview with Leifer.

[74] Hussin Mutalib, "At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millenium," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 19 No 1 (June 1997), p. 79 and Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement," p. 59.

[75] Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism," pp. 66-67.

[76] Garrett and Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," p. 29 and Paul Evans, "The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis," in Paul M. Evans, editor, *Studying Asia-Pacific Security* (Canada: Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, York University and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia, 1994), p. 298.

[77] Interview with Harris.

[78] Interview with Ball.

[79] Herman Joseph S. Kraft, "Bilateralism in the Changing Asia-Pacific Environment," *Kasarinlan* Vol 10 No 4 (2nd Quarter 1995) : 25.

[80] Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement," p. 58.

[81] Interview with Cossa and Ball.

[82] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," p. 332.

[83] N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue* Vol 25 No 4 (December 1994) : 465.

[84] Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement," p. 54.

[85] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," p. 332.

[86] Interview with Ball.

[87] Interview with Leifer.

[88] Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF," p. 974.

[89] Interview with Cossa.

[90] Mutalib, "At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millenium," p. 76.

[91] Michael Wesley, "The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 21 No 1 (April 1999) : 69.

[92] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building p. 328.

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

[94] Interview with Soesastro.

[95] Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building, p. 328.

[96] Desmond Ball, "Re-examining the Global and Regional Mechanism for Crisis-Management and Crisis-Prevention," Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Security Forum on *The Security Implications of the East Asian Financial Crisis*, sponsored by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Manila), Institute for National Policy Research (Taipei), Pacific Forum/CSIS (Honolulu) and IFRI (Paris) held at the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel, Philippines on December 19-20, 1998, p. 12.

[97] Interview with Baviera.

[98] Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, p. 20.

[99] Interview with Herman Joseph Kraft, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, April 8, 1999, and Interview with Baviera.

[100] Interview with Ball.

[101] Interview with Soesastro.

[102] Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Future Role of ASEAN: A View from an ASEAN-ISIS Member," Paper based on a draft presentation prepared for the "Workshop on East Asia at a Crossroads: Challenges for ASEAN" organized by the Institute of International Relations, Hanoi, September 24-25, 1998, p. 11.

[103] *Ibid.*

[104] See Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-building," pp. 319-340.

[105] The following discussion is based on the author's notes taken during the Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and the United States Institute of Peace held in Singapore on April 2-5, 2000.

[106] Amitav Acharya, "What Preventive Diplomacy Is (Or Ought Not to Be), and What It Is Not (Or Must Not Be): Reviewing the Preventive Diplomacy Concept and Agenda in the Asia-Pacific" (A Report Prepared by CSCAP-Singapore for the Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures, United States Institute of Peace, and CSCAP-Thailand held in Bangkok, Thailand, February 28-March 1, 1999), p. 8.

[107] Simon S.C. Tay and Obood Talib, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Preparing for Preventive Diplomacy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 19 No 3 (December 1997) : 256.

[108] Amitav Acharya, "Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic Crisis," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol 21 No 1 (April 1999): 18.

[109] *Ibid.*